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Summary
Objective: To evaluate the impact of junk food broadcast marketing policies on na-
tionwide junk food sales and identify policy characteristics effective in reducing sales.
Methods: Country policy data (n = 79) were categorized in a thorough literature
review and analysed using a repeated measures design against data on food sales
per capita. Study conducted in United States, 2017.
Results: Countries with junk food broadcast marketing policies saw a decrease in
junk food sales per capita after implementation, while those without said policies
saw an increase (p = 0.013). Countries with statutory policies saw a decrease in
sales per capita, while those with only self-regulation saw an increase
(p = 0.004). Audience restrictions (p = 0.024) and standardized nutrition criteria
(p = 0.008) were policy characteristics significantly associated with a decrease in
sales per capita.
Conclusions: Utilizing a novel approach to evaluate junk food broadcast market-
ing policies, the study demonstrated that countries with statutory policies saw a sig-
nificant decrease in junk food sales per capita not seen in countries with no or only
self-regulatory policies. To effectively reduce exposure to child-targeted junk food
marketing, governments should establish strong, comprehensive statutory regula-
tions. Additionally, countries that implement junk food marketing policies can
use food sales data to track policy effectiveness.
Keywords: Food marketing policy, non-communicable diseases, processed foods.
Abbreviations: US, United States; FTC, US Federal Trade Commission; WHO,
World Health Organization; HFSS, Foods high in fat, salt or sugar; UK, United
Kingdom; HDI, Human Development Index; CPI, Corruption Perceptions Index;
IFBA, International Food and Beverage Association.
Introduction
Today, we have reached a point where diet-related illnesses
linked with the over-consumption of food outweigh the
global burden of hunger (1). Cardiovascular disease is the
world’s leading cause of death, 9% of the world population
suffers from diabetes (2) and over two billion adults are
overweight or obese (1). In many countries, such as the
United States (US), overweight has become the new norm.
The prevalence of diet-related illnesses continues to rise,
particularly among youth, despite medical advances that
have significantly reduced deaths due to diet-related disease
(3). Worldwide, 50 million girls and 74 million boys were
obese in 2016, compared with just five million girls and
six million boys in 1975 (4). While obesity has traditionally
been thought of as a disease of the Western world, emerging
nations now harbour the majority of persons that are
overweight and obese (3), most likely due to a shift towards
the Western diet (5).
The overconsumption of unhealthy foods is a major
contributing factor to childhood overweight and obesity,
but dietary interventions can prevent and often reverse
obesity reviews doi: 10.1111/obr.12678
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overweight and obese status (2). However, families are
challenged by aggressive food marketing tactics that
continue to promote junk food to children (6). In 2012, the
total advertising spending for healthier foods in the US, in-
cluding milk ($169 million), bottled water ($81 million),
vegetables ($72 million) and fruit ($45 million), was less
than one-twelfth that of fast food restaurant advertising
alone ($4.6 billion) (7). In 2009, the US Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) determined that nearly $1.8 billion
(18.5% of all food marketing expenditures) was spent on
marketing food and beverages to US children (6). These
dollars are not going to waste: the average American child
watches nearly 4,700 food-related ads per year, with 84%
of ads marketing junk food (8). It has been well-established
that the massive bombardment of junk food marketing is
contributing significantly to the overconsumption of junk
foods in children, and thus the epidemic of childhood
overweight and obesity (9).
Due to their stage of development, children are more
vulnerable to marketing tactics than adults as they may
not yet be able to comprehend the intent of advertise-
ments (10). Indeed, based on an accumulation of research
on the effects of broadcast marketing, TV advertising
likely has a direct impact on child food preferences (11).
Even the appearance of media characters on packaging
alters a child’s perception on how food tastes (12).
Child-targeted advertising also impacts family purchases.
Research shows that although parents are perceived as
the primary decision makers, child preferences are the
major influencing factor behind snack purchases and
meal preparation (11). Additionally, studies consistently
find that exposure to food advertisements is linked to
increased consumption patterns and obesity in children
(13–15), while healthier food advertisements have been
negatively correlated to the prevalence of overweight
children (15).
In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) urged
countries to regulate food and beverage marketing for
products high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, sugars
and/or salt to children (16). Although the resolution was
endorsed by 192 member states, many have relied on
industry self-regulation, wherein the food industry regulates
their own marketing practices (17).
The lack of statutory food marketing regulations may be
attributed to corporate push-back. In 2011, the Obama
administration called on food manufacturers to adopt
voluntary marketing restrictions of unhealthy foods to
children (18). The food industry, under the guise of the
Sensible Food Policy Coalition, responded with claims that
such restrictions would have no impact on the obesity crisis
and unjustifiably restrict the industry’s right to free speech,
despite the fact that the standards were voluntary (18).
The proposal was subsequently delayed. Recently, the
corporate-sponsored International Life Sciences Institute
funded a 2017 review claiming that ‘no clear link exists
between added sugar intake and health outcomes’ (19).
Junk food marketing policies have been implemented
worldwide in the form of government statutes and self-
regulatory codes (17). While self-regulation has been largely
ineffective in reducing the number of unhealthy food
advertisements (20) and youth marketing exposure (21),
government legislation, such as in South Korea, has been
shown to reduce child marketing exposure, mirrored by a
fall in advertising budgets (22). Quebec imposed legislation
in 1980 that prohibited advertising to children under
13 years old, which resulted in a US$88 million reduction
in fast-food consumption per year (23). This ban did not im-
pact American TV channels, and it was subsequently found
that compared with French-speaking children, English-
speaking children tended to watch more American
children’s TV channels and thus had more children’s cereals
in the home and were able to recognize significantly more
advertised toys. After adjusting for cultural differences, it
was confirmed that the Quebec ban was the likely reason
for these differences (24). Despite these findings, few
research studies have investigated the role of food market-
ing policies on food consumption behaviours. The aim of
this study was to survey the current status of national junk
food broadcast marketing policies worldwide and to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of said policies by measuring changes in
junk food sales per capita per country. It was hypothesized
that countries which enacted policies regulating junk food
broadcast marketing would experience a greater decrease
in junk food sales per capita after policy implementation
compared with countries that did not. Additionally, it was
hypothesized that countries with statutory policies and
stricter policies would experience a greater decrease in junk
food sales per capita compared with self-regulatory policies
and less strict policies, respectively. Strictness was
determined for each individual variable, such that policies
that applied more comprehensive or more clearly defined
restrictions within a measured variable were determined to
be stricter than those that were less so.
Methods
Junk food consumption
Data were collected from the Passport Global Market
Information Database by EuroMonitor International,
which has been used in various health-related food sales
analyses (25–27). Retail/off-trade and foodservice volume
food sales data from 2002 and 2016 were collected in the
form of kg per capita country-level sales for select, packaged
food categories. The identification of packaged food catego-
ries used in this analysis took on a two-stage process. The
United Kingdom (UK) Code of Broadcast Advertising (28)
definition of HFSS products, those foods high in fat, salt
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or sugar, was used as the framework to identify types of
HFSS foods. EuroMonitor provides sales data on broadly
defined packaged food categories; thus, processed food con-
sumption and advertising data from Baker and Friel (25),
the FTC (6) and WHO-Europe (29) were used to identify
the following EuroMonitor packaged food categories as
top contributors to fat, salt and sugar consumption: baked
goods, breakfast cereals, confectionary, ready meals,
savoury snacks, and sweet biscuits, snack bars and fruit
snacks (Table S1). EuroMonitor packaged food categories,
which were mutually exclusive, were summed to create the
variable total per capita junk food sales. EuroMonitor notes
that in its data compilation, ‘packaged’ foods are synony-
mous with ‘processed’ foods.
Carbonates (i.e. soda) were also identified as a top
contributor to sugar consumption (25). However, carbon-
ates were analysed separate from the original data set as
they were found to be advertised almost exclusively to teen-
agers, not children, in the US. In 2009, the FTC found that
97% of youth-directed marketing for soft drink expendi-
tures were directed towards teenagers, and only 3% to-
wards children under 12 (6). This is in contrast to food
marketing expenditures. For example, $173 million of
$186 million of youth-directed marketing expenditures for
breakfast cereals were directed towards children. Because
little information on food advertising in developing coun-
tries has been published, the assumption is made that a
similar disparity between carbonate and food marketing
expenditures exists in all countries. Moreover, junk food
marketing restrictions most often apply to children 12 years
and younger; thus, junk food broadcast marketing policies
were expected to have minimal impact on carbonate sales
compared with their impact on the selected EuroMonitor
packaged food categories. Additionally, in EuroMonitor,
carbonates volume sales data were provided in litres
whereas foods were provided in kilograms.
National food marketing policies
Countries (n = 80) for which EuroMonitor data were
available were evaluated in a thorough literature review
for the evidence of junk food broadcast marketing policies
implemented between 2003 and the end of 2014. Taiwan
was excluded due to lack of Human Development Index
(HDI) data, which was used as a covariate, leaving a sample
size of 79 countries. Countries were identified as having a
junk food broadcast marketing policy if (i) the policy
addressed junk food specifically or affected junk food
marketing in a significant way; (ii) the policy applied to at
least television marketing and the country nationwide; and
(iii) the policy was implemented on January 1, 2003 or later,
and before December 31, 2014. Policies were excluded if
they applied exclusively to soft drinks and/or energy drinks,
or applied exclusively to non-television mediums or
environments. Countries with one or more junk food broad-
cast marketing policy satisfying the inclusion and exclusion
criteria were considered ‘policy countries.’ Countries absent
of any such policy were considered ‘non-policy countries.’
Nine sources were used to identify and characterize
national junk food broadcast marketing policies, including
journal articles, policy databases and official documents
from organizations on health and advertising (Table S2).
Policy data were confirmed by sourcing the original policy
document, when available, through industry and govern-
ment websites, publications and news articles. After
exhausting the above resources, if no policy information
was found on a country relevant to junk food broadcast
marketing, it was assumed the said country had no relevant
policy.
Individual policies were characterized across ten variables
(Table 1) under two domains: policy type and implementa-
tion variables. For countries with multiple policies, data
from each policy were aggregated into single values per
variable per country. For marketing techniques and media,
data were first dummy coded (1 = restriction present;
0 = not present) for each category, and then all categories
were summed to create a single index variable (e.g. Country
A restricts junk food marketing in television and radio
under variable ‘media’, thus is categorized as ‘2 media
restrictions’). All other variables were coded as categorical
data according to the strictest policy in a country per
variable. Categories refer to groups within each variable.
For general method, 47 out of 49 countries had a policy
restrictive in nature and one country only utilized guidance.
Therefore, guidance and restrictions were combined into
one category.
This design was modelled after the template by Hawkes
and Lobstein (17). The UK Code of Broadcast Advertising
(28) and the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland’s Children’s
Commercial Communication Code (30) were used to iden-
tify key marketing technique restrictions for characteriza-
tion. WHO recommendations (16), and recommendations
by Consumers International and International Association
for the Study of Obesity (31), were used to establish
measures for audience restrictions.
Data analysis
IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used to perform a series of
repeated measures ANOVA (α ≤ 0.05) to evaluate
EuroMonitor food sales data pre- and post-policy imple-
mentation for the above policy characteristics. Policy
variables were analysed for policy and non-policy countries;
implementation variables were analysed for policy countries
only. Policy type and implementation variables were ad-
justed with the following covariates: 2015 HDI from the
United Nations Development Programme, 2015 Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International
Junk food marketing regulations & sales Y. Kovic et al. 763obesity reviews
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and 2016 median age of each country’s population from the
Central Intelligence Agency.
The HDI is a comprehensive measure of country develop-
ment that includes life expectancy, education and standard
of income by gross national income per capita, with higher
values indicating greater development. HDI was included
because advances in social and economic development
are associated with the transition towards diets high in
fat, sugar and salt (32). The CPI quantifies corruption in
the public sector, and higher values indicate less govern-
ment corruption. Each year, tens of billions of dollars in
bribes allow corporations to disregard the law (33), and
regulatory bodies that wish to implement junk food
marketing policies must perform the difficult task of
achieving corporate buy-in and/or persist in the face of
corporate backlash. In this context, the CPI adjusts for a
country’s ability for effective policy implementation. The
median age of each country’s population was included be-
cause the majority of junk food marketing policies target
youth populations. Therefore, countries with proportion-
ally larger youth populations are expected to demonstrate
a larger effect size. Implementation variables were addi-
tionally adjusted for year of policy implementation in
order to account for the impact of time on effect size.
Years of policy implementation ranged from 2004 to
2014; thus, values of 2009 were set at 0, with all other
values ranging from 5 to +5.
Results
In all, 49 countries (62%) had at least one junk food broad-
cast marketing policy. Policy and non-policy countries were
significantly different in HDI (p < 0.001), CPI (p < 0.001)
and median age (p < 0.001). Non-policy countries had a
mean HDI of 0.73, CPI of 39.9 and median age of 31.1.
Policy countries had a mean HDI of 0.84, CPI of 59.2 and
median age of 37.8. Countries with statutory policies and
those with only self-regulatory policies were not signifi-
cantly different in HDI (p = 0.61), CPI (p = 0.33), median
age (p = 0.12) or year of policy implementation (p = 0.60).
Policy countries had between one to four policies in place.
Sixteen countries (33%) had enacted one or more statutory
policies. The remaining policy countries relied on self-
regulation (n = 33, 67%), which occurred on a national or
regional basis (i.e. European Union Pledge).
Table 2 illustrates the change in junk food sales over time
for each independent variable. On average, policy countries
saw a decrease (2.0%) in junk food sales per capita
between 2002 and 2016, while countries which had not
implemented policies observed an increase (+13.9%) in
sales. By regulatory type, only countries that enacted
statutory regulation saw a decrease (8.9%) in sales per
capita, while countries with only self-regulatory policies
saw an increase in sales (+1.7%).
Countries that employed audience restrictions (n = 45,
57%) or nutrition criteria (n = 45, 57%) observed a
decrease in junk food sales per capita compared with coun-
tries that did not employ these methods. Standardized nutri-
tion criteria (n = 11, 14%) were associated with a greater
Table 1 Characterization of policies
Domain Variable1 Category
Policy type Policy No
Yes
Regulatory type None
Self-regulation
Statutory regulation
Audience restrictions2 None
Multi-step approach
Comprehensive
approach
Nutrition criteria3 None
Guidance
Standardized
Implementation General method4 Guidance
Restrictions
Messaging
Marketing techniques Licensed characters
Equity brand characters
Celebrities/sports stars
Health/nutrition claims
Sponsorship
Product placement
Promotional offers
Media Television
Radio
Internet
School
Child age definitions None
12 years and younger
13 years and older
Monitoring and
enforcement5
None
Either
Both
1For countries with multiple policies, the maximum category was entered
for each variable except marketing techniques and media, which are con-
tinuous in nature. Countries were assigned a score of 0 for each variable
when a junk food broadcast marketing policy was not identified.
2Multi-step approaches restrict advertising based on time of day, percent
children in audience or percent advertising space junk foods can fill; com-
prehensive approaches ban junk food advertising entirely to a specific au-
dience (i.e. children).
3Guidance-type criteria are non-standard across advertisers, and may be
based on accepted or scientifically-based guidelines; standardized refers
to clearly defined criteria standardized for all advertisers.
4Guidance are non-specific and non-enforceable principles, and restric-
tions are prohibitions of specific methods, audiences or products; mes-
saging refers to policies that require healthy or warning messages to
accompany junk food advertisements.
5Monitoring includes methods such as the use of a monitoring body, com-
plaints procedure or clearance of applicable advertisements prior to air-
ing. Enforcement includes a range of sanctions for non-compliance (i.e.
expulsion of company from membership organization, fines, etc.).
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decrease in sales per capita (8.6%) compared with
countries using only guidance (n = 34, 43%) who saw an in-
crease in sales per capita (+0.7%). Countries utilizing messag-
ing (n = 8, 16%) had a 10.5% decrease in sales per capita;
countries without messaging observed no change in sales.
A decrease in sales per capita occurred for countries with
three (n = 22, 45%) or four (n = 22, 45%) media restrictions
(1.7% and 3.8% respectively), while countries with two
media restrictions (n = 5, 10%) saw an increase in sales
(+11.0%). For policies that defined the maximum age of a
child at 12 years or younger (n = 33, 67%), a decrease in
sales per capita was observed (2.9%), while policies that
defined the maximum age of a child at 13 or above
(n = 16, 33%), there was a minimal change in sales
(+0.1%). In order to explore this further, child age
definitions at age 13 or above were broken down into age
13–15 (n = 6, 12%), and 16 or above (n = 10, 20%).
Countries with a maximum child age definition of 16 or
above saw a decrease in sales per capita similar to child
age definitions at 12 or younger, while age 13–15 saw an
increase in sales. Five of six countries with age definitions
between 13 and 15 had only self-regulation, while eight of
the ten countries with age definitions 16 or above had
statutory regulation, suggesting that the variation in junk
food sales with child age definitions was heavily influenced
by the regulatory type of a policy.
Countries with methods for both monitoring and enforce-
ment (n = 27, 55%) saw a decrease in sales per capita
(4.4%); those with only monitoring or enforcement
(n = 8, 16%) saw an increase (+3.3%) and countries with
neither (n = 14, 29%) had minimal change (0.1%). The
majority of countries (seven out of eight) with only monitor-
ing or enforcement had self-regulation only. For marketing
techniques, only countries with three restrictions (n = 3,
6%) had an increase in sales per capita (+9.4%), while the
remainder experienced a decrease in sales, without a clear
trend. Countries with zero and three restrictions were
primarily self-regulatory (89% and 67% self-regulatory
countries respectively); all other groups were made up of
half or more countries with statutory regulation.
Table 2 Change in total junk food sales per capita by policy type
Domain Variable Category N Total junk food sales,
kg per capita (sd)
Δ (%)
2002 2016
Policy type (n = 79) Policy No 30 44.0 (31.6) 50.1 (36.9) + 6.1 (13.9)
Yes 49 79.6 (44.4) 78.0 (40.3)  1.6 (2.0)
Regulatory type None 30 44.0 (31.6) 50.1 (36.9) + 6.1 (13.9)
Self-regulation 33 78.1 (35.4) 79.4 (37.0) + 1.3 (1.7)
Statutory regulation 16 82.7 (58.8) 75.3 (47.5)  7.4 (8.9)
Audience restrictions None 34 49.5 (35.4) 55.5 (40.0) + 6 (12.1)
Multi-step approach 38 81.5 (45.0) 79.1 (40.0)  2.4 (2.9)
Comprehensive approach 7 62.6 (45.6) 62.1 (40.5)  0.5 (0.8)
Nutrition criteria None 34 48.8 (33.6) 54 (38.0) + 5.2 (10.7)
Guidance 34 73.3 (39.0) 73.8 (38.7) + 0.5 (0.7)
Standardized 11 97.5 (60.7) 89.1 (47.2)  8.4 (8.6)
Implementation (n = 49) General method None 0   
Guidance and/or restrictions 41 77.4 (41.1) 77.4 (39.0) 0 0 (0)
Messaging 8 90.7 (60.7) 81.2 (49.3)  9.5 (10.5)
Marketing techniques None 27 78.1 (43.4) 77.2 (41.0)  0.9 (1.2)
1 restrictions 6 68.2 (46.7) 65.0 (44.5)  3.2 (4.7)
2 restrictions 6 100.2 (65.3) 98.8 (52.9)  1.4 (1.4)
3 restrictions 3 66.0 (32. 5) 72.2 (33.3) + 6.2 (9.4)
4 restrictions 6 77.8 (34.8) 73.5 (29.5)  4.3 (5.5)
5 restrictions 0   
6 restrictions 1 116.0 99.3  16.7 (14.4)
Media None 0   
1 media restriction 0   
2 media restrictions 5 43.7 (50.2) 48.5 (55.5) + 4.8 (11.0)
3 media restrictions 22 84.2 (40.6) 82.8 (37.7)  1.4 (1.7)
4 media restrictions 22 83.2 (45.1) 80.0 (38.3)  3.2 (3.8)
Child age definitions None 0   
12 years and under 33 78.5 (48.7) 76.2 (43.2)  2.3 (2.9)
13 years or older 16 81.8 (35.1) 81.9 (34.4) + 0.1 (0.1)
Monitoring and
enforcement
None 14 74.6 (34.9) 74.5 (36.0)  0.1 (0.1)
Either 8 80.0 (50.8) 82.6 (50.9) + 2.6 (3.3)
Both 27 82.1 (48.1) 78.5 (40.5)  3.6 (4.4)
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After adjustment for covariates, presence of a policy
(p = 0.013), regulatory type (p = 0.004), audience restric-
tions (p = 0.024) and nutrition criteria (p = 0.008) predicted
significant differences in the change of junk food sales per
capita over time (Table 3). Messaging was significant before
adjustment (p = 0.035) and became non-significant after
adjustment (p = 0.053). Regulatory type was a significant
covariate for the following models: audience restrictions
(p = 0.016), marketing techniques (p = 0.036), media
(p = 0.039) and child age definitions (p = 0.004).
A separate analysis was performed for carbonate sales per
capita for each of the policy variables. Before adjustment
with covariates, policy (p = 0.027), audience restrictions
(p = 0.017), nutrition criteria (p = 0.016) and media
(p = 0.049) were significantly associated with a change in
carbonate sales per capita. After adjustment with covari-
ates, no variable was significantly associated with carbonate
sales per capita. Time and HDI were significantly associated
in the change of carbonate sales per capita for all variables.
Discussion
In the present study, countries with statutory policies on
junk food broadcast marketing observed a decrease in mean
total junk food sales per capita between 2002 and 2016,
while non-policy countries and countries relying on industry
self-regulation saw an increase in sales per capita. Both
presence of policy and regulatory type were significantly
associated with the change in total junk food sales per
capita over time.
Decreased sales per capita in policy countries are likely
due to a reduction in junk food advertisements, which were
targeted by these policies. As mentioned earlier, studies have
shown that junk food broadcast marketing policies can
decrease junk food marketing. In Brazil, one year after the
implementation of Conanda Resolution 163, food and
drink advertisements directed to children made up only
5.6% of TV ads observed. In contrast, studies before the
ban identified up to four times as many child-targeted food
and drink commercials (34). Thus, the presence of broad-
cast marketing restrictions for junk food products may
predict a decrease in junk food advertisements, which may
be followed by decreased junk food consumption.
Decreased sales per capita in countries with statutory
policies, but not those with only self-regulatory policies, is
likely a reflection of the ineffectiveness of self-regulation.
For example, in Australia, where three separate self-
regulatory codes were implemented in 2009 to restrict junk
food marketing, studies found that little to no progress had
been made in reducing children’s exposure to food
advertising. In 2011, two years after policy implementa-
tion, the rate of ‘non-core’ food commercials was not sig-
nificantly different from 2006 (35), and the rate of fast
food commercials was significantly higher (1.8 per hour
versus 1.1 per hour) (36).
Stricter junk food broadcast marketing policies were
associated with a greater decrease in junk food sales per
capita compared with less strict policies. Specifically,
countries that employed standardized nutrition criteria
(versus guidance nutrition criteria or none) and messaging
(versus no messaging requirements) saw a decrease in junk
food sales per capita after policy implementation. It must
be noted that more stringent policy characteristics are inher-
ently linked to statutory legislation. For instance, eight out
of 16 countries (50%) with statutory policies established
standardized nutrition criteria, compared with three out of
33 countries (9%) with self-regulation. Only two countries
using self-regulation (6%) implemented messaging, while
six countries with statutory regulations (38%) did. Messag-
ing produced a large decrease in junk food sales (10.5%)
that was significant before adjustment with covariates
(p = 0.035) but became non-significant after adjustment
(p = 0.053). This is likely due to the small sample size of
the study. In a future study with a larger number of coun-
tries utilizing messaging techniques, messaging may produce
a significant result after adjustment with covariates.
Table 3 Association of policy type by change in junk food sales per capita
Domain Variable Unadjusted Adjusted1
F df sig F df sig
Policy type (n = 79) Policy 7.2 1,77 0.009 6.4 1,74 0.013
Regulatory type 6.7 2,74 0.002 5.8 2,73 0.004
Audience restrictions 4.3 2,76 0.016 3.9 2,73 0.024
Nutrition criteria 5.4 2,76 0.006 5.1 2,73 0.008
Implementation (n = 49) General method 4.7 1,47 0.035 3.9 1,43 0.053
Marketing techniques2 0.5 1,47 0.47 0.9 1,43 0.34
Media2 1.6 1,47 0.21 1.5 1,43 0.22
Child age definitions 0.4 1,47 0.51 0.3 1,43 0.58
Monitoring and enforcement 1.0 2,46 0.38 1.0 2,42 0.38
1Adjusted for HDI, CPI and median age of country; implementation variables adjusted for above and year of implementation.
2Inputted as continuous variables.
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The lack of association between policy variables and
carbonate sales per capita after adjustment with covariates
may indicate that current junk food broadcast marketing
restrictions are not strict enough to have a significant
impact on carbonate sales. Additionally, food broadcast
marketing restrictions may simply be too broad in their
scope, and soda-specific restrictions are needed to produce
a significant impact on soda sales.
The majority of industry pledges surveyed in this study
originated from the International Food and Beverage
Association (IFBA). Due to the IFBA’s European Union
and Gulf Cooperation Council regional pledges in addition
to worldwide infiltration of IFBA’s national pledges, most
policy countries (90%) had at least one industry pledge in
place. All surveyed industry pledges were written and imple-
mented after 2003, with the first industry junk food market-
ing pledges initiated in 2006. Thus, it is likely that all
industry pledges through the end of 2014 were captured in
the study. Since Hawkes and Lobstein’s 2011 analysis
(17), more countries have implemented statutory regula-
tions on food marketing to children.
Regional voluntary pledges obscure the lines between
policy and non-policy countries. In this study, regional
industry pledges were coded as self-regulatory policies for
all countries in the region. The presence of regional industry
pledges may have no relation to a government’s intent to
establish statutory policies or encourage self-regulation.
Thus, industry pledges in these countries may have mini-
mal government oversight and public health impact.
Within this study, monitoring and enforcement methods
were defined broadly, which decreased the ability to detect
an effect among highly variable enforcement methods.
Self-regulatory policies tended towards less stringent
enforcement methods such as expulsion from voluntary
alliances, withdrawal of advertisements or citation of
non-compliant cases on their website. Government poli-
cies often cited the revocation of advertising licences or
punishment by fines and imprisonment. The vast differ-
ences in enforcement methods under self-regulatory and
government forces may impact corporate incentive to
comply, thereby diminishing the ability to detect the im-
pact of enforcement on junk food sales.
Regardless of the strength of a nation’s policy, restrictions
can appear to be ineffective if cross-border marketing is not
addressed. For example, Sweden’s 1996 ban on child-
targeted television and radio advertising was challenged by
the European Court of Justice that ruled that the policy
restrained trade and discriminated against transnational
broadcasters (37). In the present study, only Ecuador’s
2013 Law on Communications restricted foreign advertise-
ments. Canada and Ireland’s junk food marketing policies
specifically excluded application to foreign media.
Countries with policies were disproportionately more
likely than countries without such regulations to be from
Europe and North America and those of very high develop-
ment status. In addition to a lack of junk food marketing
policies, less developed countries tend to have younger
populations. Tobacco companies have been widely criti-
cized for purposefully targeting youth populations, a tactic
that the food industry has adopted today (38). The large
youth populations of developing nations make them a ripe
target for junk food sales, especially as food corporations
are increasingly criticized and regulated in wealthier states.
Additionally, while countries without policies saw an
increase in junk food sales over time in this study, they also
had lower junk food sales compared with countries
regulating junk foods in any given year. Thus, the increase
in junk food sales in non-policy countries may be partially
explained by the growing market of HFSS food sales in
developing countries.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. The limited sample size of
countries made it difficult to establish differences across
categories and to generalize findings to all countries.
Additionally, because EuroMonitor reported packaged food
sales data for only 80 countries starting from 2002, not all
policies (e.g. Sweden’s 1996 General Marketing Act) were
available for analysis under study conditions. Policy data
were not confirmed with country informants; therefore, it
is not certain whether policies are fully implemented
and/or actively enforced. It is also possible that some non-
policy countries had junk food marketing policies in place
that were not measured. Additionally, while countries
without policies saw an increase in junk food sales per
capita over time in this study, they also had lower junk
food sales compared with countries regulating junk foods
in any given year. Thus, the increase in junk food sales in
non-policy countries may be partially explained by the
growing food market within developing countries. While
EuroMonitor packaged food categories were selected based
on their high contributions to fat, sugar and salt consump-
tion, these categories are broadly defined and likely
included a number of non-HFSS foods. Due to the nature
of EuroMonitor data, we were unable to only include
foods that correspond to the definition of HFSS foods.
Finally, the study did not consider advertising via new
media (e.g. online, mobile devices) or national healthy food
initiatives or obesity control policies. Because the former is
most likely to increase junk food consumption while the
latter is most likely to decrease consumption, these exclu-
sions may have a null effect on the present analysis.
Conclusion
This study utilized a novel approach to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of junk food marketing policies by measuring
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changes in junk food sales per capita in an ecological study
design. In light of this study, the authors recommend those
countries that have adopted statutory or self-regulatory pol-
icies study food sales and health data within their country
before and after implementation to confirm the present find-
ings. Food sales data allows countries to observe policy im-
pact and the role of junk food advertising in their
population’s decision-making. Incorporating health data,
especially on childhood and adult overweight/obesity and
type II diabetes, which the present study was unable to do,
would allow countries to observe whether policy implemen-
tation has a large enough impact to affect health outcomes.
Diverse outcome measures, such as junk food advertise-
ments, junk food sales and health outcome measures,
should be used to determine the overall impact of a junk
food marketing policy. Additionally, future studies may in-
vestigate the impact of new media advertising, which is
largely unaddressed in junk food marketing policies, on
junk food sales.
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